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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
DAVID NELSON a n d  LOY PEHRSON, e t  al, ) Supreme Court Docket W35543-2008 
) (Custer County Case  #CV 2005-9 1 )  
Plaintiffs-Counterdefendants-Appellants, ) 
i 
v. I 
BIG LOST RIVER IRRIGATION DISTRICT; 
Board of Directors, RICHARD REYNOLDS, 
CHARLIE HUGGINS, KENT HARWOOD, 
JOEL ANDERSON, M. MARX HINTZE, 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF \WATER RESOURCES, 
a n d  DAVID R.  TUTHILL, JR., Director, 
Defendants-Counterclaimants- 
Crossdefendanis-Reswndents. 
a n d  
ROBERT WADDOUPS, et  al, JAY F 
PEARSON, et  al, 
Intervenors-Counterclaimants 
Crossclaimants-Respondents. 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE 7th JUDICIAL DISTRICT FOR CUSTER COUNTY 
HONORABLE JON J. SHINDURLING, DISTRICT JUDGE, PRESIDING 
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Ill. ARGUMENI 
A. Each Respondent attempts to evade the dispositive, substantive issue in 
this case, whether the District has the power to ignore the judicial 
apportionment of water, which specifically and automatically occurs at 
the reservoir. 
The great white elephant in the room the Respondents decline to 
acknowledge, even though they admit an ldaho irrigation district has only the 
powers conferred by statute or necessarily implied, is the 1936 Decree, and 
specifically its apportioning all of the district's storage water to individual 
consumers 6t the reservoir. In their misguided attempts to argue the Big Lost 
River Irrigation District (hereinafter "District") has statutory discretion to equitably 
distribute water, they ignore the undeniable fact that, by decree, the only 
water available for distribution from the reservoir has already been divided 
among the consumers. Rll. p. 51 -52. 
In short, and for reasons further explained below, Respondents ignore 
the law of Title 43, Chapter 4 of the ldaho Code, which provides districts only 
have the powers that are judicially decreed to them when an irrigation district 
is created or reformed under that Chapter. Also, Respondents ignore the 
unambiguous law that the apportionment is conclusive of all matters 
considered in the proceedings. American Falls Reservoir District v. Thrall, 39 
ldaho 105, 130, 228, 236 ( 1  924); ldaho Code $43-406 (any reopening of the 
case "shall not be considered as authorizing the rehearing of the matter 
theretofore heard and decided"]. An irrigation district has no power to undo 
the judicial apportionment so that it can allocate conveyance losses without 
respecting the mandated apportionment to individual properties. 
In 1936, the District was reformed and judicially approved so that each 
of the individuals would be given his or her "cup" of water, as measured in the 
reservoir. Each cup of water leaving the reservoir i s  apportioned to an 
individual, and the District has no power to take water from one individual's 
cup to give to another individual -- period, The District, in hindsight, thinks it 
might be more fair, or more equitable, to dip into the cup of every user in 
equal amounts, rather than have those who lose more of their cup during 
conveyance through the river sustain that loss individually. Those ideas are 
completely beside the point. The District simply lacks the power to do that. 
Intervenors would have the Court think otherwise; they know of no other 
irrigation district, other than the Big Lost River Irrigation District, that allocates 
based on a measurement of water in the reservoir, as opposed to an amount 
delivered at their downstream headgate. Appellants submit that is exactly the 
point. 
In this case, in the 19301s, the voters, consumers, District, and Court all 
decided to divide and measure the cup in the reservoir, not at the 
downstream headgates. They did this knowing the river channel incurs 
significant amounts of shrink in the miles below the reservoir. Under I.C. 543- 
406, and its predecessor statute which is substantially identical, that decision 
cannot and should not be revisited 
B. This Court has jurisdiction to decide whether the District may lawfully 
urldercut the original judicial apportionment of water to its consumers 
Respondents argue this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction on two 
grounds, each of which lacks merit: 
1 .  No one seeks to readjudicafe any wafer right, which would confe~ 
iurisdiction on the SRBA Court. 
The District contends this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because 
Appellants are seeking to re-adjudicate a water right. There is no merit to this 
accusation. The District simply fails to distinguish between its own obligation to 
follow the 1936 Decree and deliver apportioned water and the notion that a 
water right may have more than one point of diversion, or more accurately 
point of re-diversion, after it is diverted into the reservoir and becomes 
apportioned. 
2. Exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required because 
IDWR's Rules are not at issue. 
The District also erroneously contends there is some exhaustion 
requirements because the river-by-reach rules are implicated. What they fail 
to acknowledge is that the rules, as the affidavit of Mr. Shaw explains, were 
implemented in about 1994 in order to preserve the requirements of the 1936 
Decree. R. p. 142. In other words, the significance of the rules is that iDWR, 
and the District which participated in the rulemaking process, recognized that 
shrink had to be accounted for in each significant reach of the river, and not 
universally. In other words, while Respondents say there are no significant 
issues of fad, the affidavits clearly demonstrate that Appellants' version, i.e. 
apportionment in the reservoir, was an ongoing issue that everybody, 
including the District, understood to be resolved in 1994 by the rule mandating 
the allocation of conveyance loss by river reach. See Tr. p. 377-379. 
In sum, the rules and their negotiation are significant evidence that 
consumers were continuing to insist on reductions only for the actual shrinkage 
incurred in the delivery, and not universaliy. This evidence fundamentally 
undercuts Mr. Reynolds' assertions that there has been some form of universal 
shrink or pre-shrinkage formula since the 1930s. 
C. The district court appropriately reconsidered the claims, as it had 
discretion to do to get to the merits of the case. 
Respondents also contend that the various amendments of the 
pleadings and request for reconsideration are inappropriate. They fail to point 
out the District Judge fundamentally disagreed. He stated during the last 
hearing that he was aware of his discretion with regard to the timeliness of 
amendments and his ability to reconsider. Pi-, p. 374-375. He chose to allow 
the proceedings to go forward indicating he preferred a decision on the 
merits. Respondents have not shown legal error or an abuse of discretion. 
D. Respondents' other assertions lack merit. 
Respondents have made various other assertions: somehow they claim 
the absence of language specifically discussing conveyance loss below the 
reservoir extinguishes the judicial apportionment within the reservoir. The water 
does not lose its apportioned character when taken from the reservior. They 
also contend there are various other jurisdictional or procedural errors such as 
ci lack of standing or inappropriate pleadings. Each of fhese assertions lacks 
merit as already discussed 
To say Appellants are not owners of property entitled to receive water 
from the Disirict is, first, a new argument which cannot be raised for the first 
time on appeal. Second, Appellants have pled they each are consumers of 
water from the District, taking their allotments above the Blaine diversion 
structure, and being deprived of their allotment. R.  p. 75; 78-79 
To say Appellants lack standing, or that the issue of universal shrink has 
not been properly raised, is simply to contradict the very result the intervenors 
would like to have upheld through the lower court's stipulated decree to 
mandate universal shrink. If it was not an issue, then it was erroneous for the 
disirict court to enter a decree in that regard. 
E. The 1936 Decree apportions all water to individual consumers once it 
enters the reservoir, and the District has no discretion to "un-apportion" or 
otherwise aggregate the water which has already been judicially divided as it 
leaves the reservoir. 
A large part of Respondents' arguments focus on the assertion that the 
I936 Decree does not speak in specific terms about how conveyance losses 
below the reservoir shall be charged to individual consumers. This misses the 
poinl. Once the water enters the reservoir it is automatically apportioned by 
the judicial decree. Thus, the real question is how is ii that the District purports 
to have derived powers to un-apportion water when it leaves the reservoir? 
What it must deliver under the decree is apportioned water. What is not 
sanctioned by statute or decree is some magic wand that empowers the 
District to reapportion, or more accurately, do away with apportionment, while 
the water is in the river. The complete hypocrisy of such a position is disclosed 
by the fact that the District admits that once water leaves the river, the 
conveyance losses in the canal must be borne by those people on the canal. 
Universal shrink is nothing more than an attempt to ignore the 1936 Decree. 
F. Universal shrink is the antithesis of apportioning at the reservoir. 
As has already been pointed out, Respondents focus too much on the 
position that the 1936 Findings and Decree do not address haw conveyance 
he reservoir. The 
fallacy of this argument is demonstrated by lniervenors' own assertions: 
conveyance losses are not addressed because the water is already 
apportioned and remains attached to the individual property owners from the 
time it enters the reservoir until the time it arrives at their property or canal. 
What the Decree and findings do is address how water is allocated if 
there is extra water, short water, and even breaks in the canals. It also 
addresses evaporation from the reservoir. In each instance it dictates an 
adjustment to how much each consumer is entitled to, based on the 
apportionment in the reservoir. Omitting reference to conveyance losses of 
already apportioned water is not an oversight, but a practical recognition of 
the fact the water was already divided amongst the consumers. 
In sum, as Intervenors state, the Big Losf River lrrigafion District is unlike 
any other, precisely because it apportions at the reservoir and not at the 
headgates. It is not for this Court, nor any other, to second-guess that decision 
that was made in the 1930s on a river named for the water it loses. This is 
especially so when put in coniext: the reservoir and canals were bought and 
reconfigured by the consumers in the 1930s because the irrigation project 
simply lacked the water to be a successful irrigation project. That is precisely 
why the I936 Decree and findings removed much land from the project and 
only provide storage water to those who already have in stream flow rights. 
More practically speaking, the universal shrink scheme is bad for each user in 
the sense that it has apprised each consumer of the ability to manage his 
farming operations because he cannot control when or how much of his 
apportioned water he may receive. With universal shrink, the amount of 
apportioned water which will be consumed on any given day depends 
entirely on who else is using water. If one of the Mackay Users asks for his water 
on a given day, instead of knowing how much he will be charged based on 
the conveyance loss to his property, under the universal shrink scheme he may 
lose half or more of his water simply because people in Arco happened to be 
using water on that day. To suggest the voters bought into such an arbitrary 
scheme is to underestimate their practicality. 
The far better interpretation is to read ihe 1936 decree just as if 's written. 
Apportionment is in the reservoir. Each consumer is responsible for 
conveyance losses of his cup of water, and each consumer can make the 
economic decision about whether to improve a part of the river channel, 
according to Chapter 4, Title 43, based on what benefits he and his neighbors 
on that reach might receive. Also under that Chapter, the cost of paying for 
those benefits is borne by those, and only those who do benefit in fact. 
G. The statutory scheme fixes the judicial apportionment, leaving it to 
those, like Intervenors, who would benefit from later building other 
canals or otherwise avoiding river shrink, to pay for such improvements. 
As just mentioned, when Chapter 4 is read as awhole, it is clear that 
those who benefit from improvements should pay for them. This attempt to 
invoke a universal shrink ignores the fundamental fact that ail water leaving 
the reservoir is already apportioned as well as the legislative decision to put 
the burden of paying for subsequent improvements on those, and only on 
those, who would benefit. The Mackay Users derive no benefit and in fact 
sustain substantial losses in the amount of water they receive if the District is 
allowed to invoke universal shrink. 
H. The District's Bylaws admit the water is apportioned at the reservoir and 
each consumer has the right to benefit. 
The District would have the Court believe it repealed Section 5 of its 
Bylaws (R.  Vol. ll., p. 99) in 1964 where they say that "any wafer belonging to 
him [a consumer] by such storage right or correct flow right under said 
assessment and apportionment of benefits, in the District's Reservoir. ..." is 
entitled to the delivery of such water. The District would have the Court 
believe that the language in that section deletes the entire paragraph, not just 
the part in brackets. Appellants submit the Court can read the entire set of 
bylaws (RII. p. 99-10]), which makes it obvious that deletions to the bylaws only 
apply to practice portions. In short, the District is attempting to take part of the 
cups of water belonging to Appellants, and will even go so far as to make a 
preposterous argument that they have somehow had the power and used 
that power to defeat the consumers rights under the 1936 Decree. Such a 
position clearly takes legitimate argument to an absurd and frivolous position. 
I. IDWR's Rules follow the statutory scheme by requiring conveyance losses 
in the river to be accounied for on a reach basis, so losses are 
accounted for based on where each lserson diverts water from the river. 
Respondents also attempt to avoid the real issue of judicial 
apportionment by contending that IDWR's rules do not compel the District to 
account for conveyance losses according the actual losses occurred in each 
reach of the river. Once again, this is a red herring. 
As David Shaw states in his Affidavit, R. p. 142, the ruies were negotiated 
to preserve the equitable distribution by preserving the allocation of delivery 
losses on a reach basis. This is evidence consistent with the 1936 Decree. It is 
contrary to Respondents' assertions that the District has some power to 
implement universal shrink. IDWR's authority under I.C. $42-801 is to account 
for water in the river, based on " . . . the persons and ditches entitled to its use" 
There is simply no authority for the proposition IDWR can abdicate that 
statutory duty. Thus, the District's position that it can un-apportion water and 
ignore IDWR's accounting of losses is all the more arbitrary. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above and in the opening brief, Appellants 
submit that the only power the District has is to deliver apportioned water. it 
lacks any authority to un-apportion for the purposes of conveyance losses. 
The 1936 Decree specifically mandates each consumer receive specific 
amounts from the time the water enters the reservoir, which is the antithesis of 
shared shrink down to headgates. This Court should uphold those rights of the 
consumers, and award fees for the District's arbitrary atiempts to undo this 
longstanding judicial apportionment. 
r 
Additionally, if the Court disagrees, ihere remain issues of fact about the 
scope and intent of the decree, subsequent history, and the ruies as well as 
their application to this case. Consequently, and in the alternative, the Court 
shouid remand the case for a trial to decide the facts. 
L5 day of March, 2009. Respectfuily subrnitied this - 
Attorney for Plaintiffs- 
Counterdefendants-Appellants 
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